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Abstract
Nietzsche's writing style is designed to elicit affective
responses in his readers. Humour is one of the most common
means by which he attempts to engage his readers' affects. In
this article, I explain how and why Nietzsche uses humour to
achieve his philosophical ends. The article has three parts. In
part 1, I reject interpretations of Nietzsche's humour on which
he engages in self-parody in order to mitigate the charge of
decadence or dogmatism by undermining his own philosophi-
cal authority. In part 2, I look at how Nietzsche uses humour
and laughter as a critical tool in his polemic against traditional
morality. I argue that one important way in which Nietzsche
uses humour is as a vehicle for enhancing the effectiveness of
his ad hominem arguments. In part 3, I show how Nietzsche
exploits humour's social dimension in order to find and culti-
vate what he sees as the right kinds of readers for his works.
Nietzsche is a unique figure in Western philosophy for the importance he places on laughter and humour. He is also
unique for his affectively charged style, a style frequently designed to make the reader laugh. In this article, I am pri-
marily concerned with the way in which Nietzsche uses humour, but I will inevitably discuss some of his more theo-
retical remarks on the topic, as these cannot be neatly separated. One topic I do not discuss in detail is the way
Nietzsche uses laughter, especially what he calls “higher laughter,” as a symbol for the affirmation of life.1 This is in
line with my focus on Nietzsche's humorous style. This article has three main parts. In part 1, I look at the way vari-
ous commentators appeal to Nietzsche's attempts at self-parody in order to give an account of the scope of his cri-
tique of morality. Such commentators argue that Nietzsche engages in self-parody in order to mitigate his own
decadence, or dogmatism, by undermining his claims to philosophical authority. I argue that this account of the scope
of Nietzsche's critique is too extreme and that Nietzsche can accept the charge of decadence, and dodge the charge
of dogmatism, without forfeiting authority.
In part 2, I look at the way Nietzsche uses humour and laughter as a critical tool in his polemic against traditional
morality. The idea that Nietzsche uses humour to combat morality is not new, but I hope to develop it in new ways.2
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Doxastic states that are imbued with emotion, like moral and religious beliefs, are recalcitrant. We are reluctant to
revise them in the face of counterevidence, and when we do attempt to revise them, we often do so in irrational
ways. Furthermore, it can be difficult to bring them under scrutiny at all (Alfano, 2018). They are the kinds of beliefs
that are often taken for granted as theoretical starting points. Nietzsche uses laughter in order to provide an emo-
tional counterbalance to such beliefs. Laughter dispels reverence in a way that opens up topics previously held to be
off-limits for critical scrutiny. I show further how Nietzsche uses humour to super-charge his ad hominem arguments.
Nietzsche's ad hominem arguments tend to draw attention to some contingent psychological or socio/political fact
about a philosopher in order to undermine their claims to universality or disinterestedness. If philosophers' bold
metaphysical theses are expressions of fanciful wish-fulfilment, or their claims to legislate values for all humanity
mere pretence, then there would be something incongruous, and a little amusing about them. Nietzsche jumps on
this incongruity and blows it up to massive proportions with wicked and silly humour. He could simply tell us that
philosophers' claims to universality or disinterestedness are false, and he does do this. However, convinced of the
urgency of his criticisms, and of our reluctance to revise certain beliefs in the face of argument, he chooses to ham-
mer the point home on an affective level.
One aspect of laughter that distinguishes it from other affects is its strong social dimension. In part 3, I show
how Nietzsche exploits the social dimension of humour and laughter for his philosophical purposes. Humour is social
because it fosters in-groups and out-groups. It is also an expression of shared values. Laughing together is pleasant
and offers a feeling of community and intimacy; it indicates that those laughing are like one another in some respect.
Nietzsche uses humour in order to draw like-minded thinkers out of the woodwork of what he calls “slave morality”
(BGE 260). Nietzsche was increasingly preoccupied with finding and cultivating the right kinds of readers for his
works. Given the way in which morality has entrenched itself in the modern psyche, he believes that very few people
will be receptive to his criticisms of it. Nevertheless, he recognised that modern human being are the inheritors of
both “master” and “slave” morality and that their moral feelings are often ambiguous and pull in different directions.
By making the reader laugh at the values of slave morality, values they inevitably hold dear, Nietzsche can make
them aware of ambiguities in their feelings that might otherwise pass them by. If they can find these values risible in
some respect, perhaps they are not as beholden to them as they thought. In this way, he uses humour in order to
identify and foster intimacy with those more sympathetic to his views, to strengthen their beliefs and feelings further
in his direction, and to challenge their complacent acceptance of traditional morality.
1 | SELF-PARODY AND THE SCOPE PROBLEM
A number of commentators have picked up on Nietzsche's injunctions to laugh at oneself, and his attempts at self-
parody, and used them to address what some commentators refer to as the “scope problem” (Robertson, 2012). On
the one hand, Nietzsche is obviously a critic of something called morality, and on the other, he champions an alterna-
tive ideal. For Simon Robertson, the scope problem is a matter of specifying Nietzsche's target in order to limit the
scope of his critique so that it does not apply to his own positive ideal. Some commentators on humour have
eschewed Robertson's version of the scope problem by proposing that Nietzsche's self-parody, and his injunctions
to laugh at oneself, imply that he takes his criticisms of morality apply equally to his own positive ideal. These read-
ings tend towards a relativistic interpretation of Nietzsche.
Daniel Conway claims, for example, that Nietzsche uses self-parody as a tool to mitigate his own decadence. For
Conway, Nietzsche is engaged in the same kind of task as his targets. He goes so far as to claim that the Genealogy
requires us to identify Nietzsche himself as an “ascetic priest” (Conway, 1992 p. 353). The ascetic priest plays a key
role in what Nietzsche calls the “slave revolt in morality.” He is responsible for creating a conceptual scheme in which
the slavish characteristics of passivity, non-aggression, and abstinence are explained as most valuable, and for per-
suading even the nobles to accept it. They do this in order to check the nobles' unpredictable violence and to achieve
a spiritualised form of mastery over noble and slave. For Conway, Nietzsche too is attempting to effect an evaluative
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gestalt shift in the manner of the ascetic priest. Conway claims that the early Nietzsche attempted this task naively,
while the later Nietzsche did so with self-awareness. Nietzsche came to recognise his own priestly decadence and
consequently “develops his critique of modernity out of a strategic self-parody, which ensures that these criticisms
are self-referential in scope, thus invalidating any claim he might make to the privileged perspective of the physician
of culture” (Conway, 1992 p. 354). Conway also puts this point by saying that Nietzsche's self-parody “forfeits the
epistemic privilege of the philosophical critic” and undermines “his various claims to philosophical authority”
(Conway, 1992 pp. 343, 347). Nicolas More similarly claims that Nietzsche's uses parody to “protect his own posi-
tions from charges of dogmatism by subverting the authority of all philosophers (himself included)” (More, 2014
p. 28). Sander Gilman takes this thought further to an explicitly paradoxical level by associating parody with what
others have called the “falsification thesis,” namely, the view that cognition is necessarily mired in falsification (Clark
19991990). Drawing on the unpublished work On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, he claims that Nietzsche
“turns to his own poetry for the substance of his parody, attempting to strip away everything but the vital
appearance—that the truth lies outside his grasp, that the ultimate truth is the poetic lie” (Gilman, 2001 p. 112).
These accounts of the scope of Nietzsche's critique are too extreme. Conway recognises that Nietzsche “occa-
sionally does” assert his status as a privileged physician of culture, but this is an understatement. Nietzsche makes
claims upholding the critical bite of his attack on morality far more often than he parodies that attack. While Nietz-
sche certainly recognises his own decadence, and describes parts of his own project as ascetic, he does not mean to
thereby forfeit all claims to philosophical authority. Conway's claim that book III of the Genealogy requires us to iden-
tify Nietzsche with the ascetic priest gets something right, but it is not entirely correct. In this book, Nietzsche situ-
ates his own project within the context of the ascetic ideal because it is a project driven above all by truthfulness.
Nietzsche recognises that the pursuit of truthfulness at any price is a core moral value and that his own conditioning
in traditional morality was a prerequisite for his ability to call those values into question. Nietzsche sees his own
voracious drive for truth as a product of his historical situatedness in late 19th Century Europe, and his upbringing in
traditional morality. Accordingly, he presents himself as an instrument in morality's own “self-cancellation” (GM III
27). Nevertheless, the fact that Nietzsche's critique was driven by the moral value of truthfulness does not vitiate his
own claims to truthfulness or philosophical authority. Rather, Nietzsche's relentless pursuit of the truth leads him to
question the value of truthfulness, the core of the ascetic ideal. It forces him to ask whether truth is something we
really ought to pursue at any price. Thus, Nietzsche locates himself within the scope of his critique of the uncondi-
tional value of truthfulness, but he does not take this to undermine the truthfulness of his critique, or the authority
of his positive ideal. Thus, Nietzsche can accept the charge of decadence without forfeiting authority.
Robertson's approach to the scope problem is more promising. In order to address it, he follows Maudemarie
Clark's appeal to Bernard Williams' distinction between a narrow conception of morality and a wider notion of the
ethical. Nietzsche attacks “morality,” which Robertson construes as “a system of values and obligations, compliance
with which is categorically and universally required” (Robertson, 2012 p. 107). However, this leaves room for Nietz-
sche to champion a broader ethical ideal that not one everyone ought to pursue. Robertson's preferred conception is
a quasi-aesthetic perfectionism on which Nietzsche “makes a constitutive claim about what a higher type is and how
such an individual ought to be” (Robertson, 2012 p. 107). Crucially, these oughts are non-categorical; what a higher
type ought to do is determined by their motives. On this reading, Nietzsche's criticises the categoricity and universal-
ity of morality and puts forward a different, non-categorical ideal that is immune to those criticisms. If this is the
case, then Nietzsche need not give up all authority as philosopher or cultural critic in order to mitigate the charge of
dogmatism. If Nietzsche does not claim to legislate universally, then in an important sense, he is not a dogmatist.
2 | LAUGHTER AND SLAVE MORALITY
The evidence that Nietzsche mocks or parodies his own mature positive ideal is thin. Nevertheless, he does fre-
quently encourage laughter, and laughter at oneself. Why is this the case? Commentators have noted that Nietzsche
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takes laughter to play an epistemic function. For Glazer, laughter can play a role in Nietzsche's battle against slave
morality. According to Glazer, the structure of “mirth” which is often, but not always, accompanied by its most char-
acteristic expression, laughter, is uniquely suited to rooting out and exorcising the pernicious values of slave morality.
He claims that mirth is “essentially directed toward a proposition or proclamation that one ceases to take seriously,
in the sense that one had but no longer takes it to be true or binding.” Thus, it is “psychologically impossible” to con-
sider a claim to be true or a command to be binding if one also finds it amusing (Glazer, 2017). In order to explain this
purported psychological fact, Glazer appeals to Nietzsche's drive psychology. In order to find a claim plausible, cer-
tain drives need to be held in check, including, for Glazer, the drive to laugh. When the drive to laugh gains power
over these other drives, the result is a bubbling forth of mirth, and a lapse in one's doxastic commitment to the prop-
osition one previously held true or binding. For Glazer, it is not enough to consciously disavow traditional morality
because a positive affective orientation towards morality can survive conscious disavowal; it is this positive affective
orientation that mirth pinpoints and eradicates.
Glazer's formulation gets something right about laughter, Nietzsche certainly does use laughter as a tactic to
exorcise recalcitrant moral values, but it is too strong. Nietzsche recognises that drives can group together in coali-
tions and furthermore that the drive to laugh can operate hand in hand with other drives in the pursuit of truth.
Zarathustra purportedly “laughs the truth,” and in GS 1 Nietzsche says: “To laugh at oneself as one would have to
laugh in order to laugh out the whole truth—to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for truth” (Z On
the Higher Men 7; GS 1 emphasis original). Nietzsche sometimes suggests that there is something genuinely comic
about existence and that it can be fitting to laugh at it (GS 1). Thus, it seems then that truth and laughter are not
completely opposed. Silly facts are one counterexample to Glazer's formulation. I find it amusing that Charles Darwin
thought that hedgehogs used their spines to carry strawberries to their nests, but that does not stop me from believ-
ing that the fact is true (Rundell, 2019). The fact is incongruous. Charles Darwin is one of the foremost naturalists in
human history and yet he believed this wild falsehood (which would perhaps be a little amusing even if it were true).
It seems we can also find our values amusing. I might stop a friend from stepping on a row of ants, on the grounds
that the ants' lives are valuable and so we ought to avoid ending them prematurely. Nevertheless, I might also find it
an amusing fact about myself and human beings in general that we often care deeply even about the smallest, and
most seemingly trivial of creatures. This does not stop me from valuing such creatures. Again, there is something
incongruous going on; the ants are cosmically puny, and there is an estimated quadrillion of them on earth; neverthe-
less, people often value their individual lives and think we ought not wantonly end them.3 Incongruity is not the only
reason we might find a claim or command amusing. A claim might also appear amusingly absurd to us, but this would
not stop us from taking it to be true. A proposition or command can amuse us for various reasons. Glazer claims that
mirth is directed towards a proposition that “one ceases to take seriously, in the sense that one had but no longer
takes it to be true.” Although he clearly spells out what he means by taking a proposition seriously, the intuitive force
of his point rests on an equivocation. Of course, we cannot simultaneously find a claim amusing and also take it seri-
ously, if to take a claim seriously means to not find it amusing. However, it is much less obvious that we cannot find
a claim amusing and think that it is true. On the contrary, silly, incongruous, and absurd facts abound. Even if Glazer
is wrong about the structure of mirth, he is certainly right that we often do laugh at claims that we think are false, or
commands we think are not binding, and that Nietzsche exploits this fact for philosophical and rhetorical purposes.
Humour is not unique in serving this purpose. Nietzsche engages a variety of affects in order to divest readers
of their slavish values. In addition to cultivating positive affects towards his preferred ideals, he tries to evoke nega-
tive ones towards his targets. One prominent affect is disgust or nausea [Ekel] (Fossen, 2019; Von Tevenar, 2019).
Nietzsche is constantly trying to shift his readers affective stance towards their values and rebalance the scales of
their evaluations. In book one of the Genealogy, Nietzsche gives dramatic form to the creation of slave morality out
of ressentiment. He invents a character, “Herr Vorwitz und Wagehals,” or “Mr. Wanton-Curiosity and Daredevil,”
who he sends into the shadowy and stuffy workshop where workers infested with ressentiment “fabricate ideals” (GM
I 14). What disgusts Nietzsche most is the deceit involved in the fabrication of slave morality; the workshop “stinks
of sheer lies.” frustrated by the lack of actual power over their noble oppressors, the slaves recast their
4 BODDICKER
powerlessness as a virtue and posit a fantasy revenge enacted by the establishment of the kingdom of God. In short,
the slaves are motivated by the same desire for power as their oppressors. Mr. Wanton-Curiosity and Daredevil
reacts to the spectacle of the workshop with revulsion. As Janaway notes, Nietzsche uses the drama to “enact dis-
gust on the reader's behalf”: “Enough! Enough! I can't stand it anymore. Bad air! Bad air!” (GM I 14). Janaway also
highlights the way in which Nietzsche transfers the disquiet that he cultivated earlier, against the thoughtlessly vio-
lent nobles, to the slaves (Janaway, 2007 pp. 103–4). If the nobles' untrammelled pursuit of power revolts us, should
we not also be revolted, perhaps even more so, by the slaves' covert grasping after it? At root, both value systems
share the same basis, a tendency towards power.
In this way, Nietzsche subtly manipulates his readers' affects in order to bring about a desired effect; namely, a
loosening of the ties that bind them to slave morality. As Alfano notes, Nietzsche takes certain doxastic states to
have a kind of staying power or recalcitrance (Alfano, 2018). Particularly, problematic are beliefs that are imbued with
emotion, or “thick” beliefs, like those of religion and morality. They have staying power because we are loath to
revise them in the face of counterevidence. When we do revise them, we often do so in irrational ways. Furthermore,
it can be difficult to bring them under one's critical radar at all. They are the kinds of beliefs that are generally not up
for serious discussion. When Nietzsche encourages laughter at thick beliefs, or systems of beliefs, he hopes to send a
shockwave through our default affective responses and to open up a space in which we can scrutinise such beliefs.
A rich vein of Nietzschean humour can be found in his frequent use of ad hominem argument. Nietzsche's ad
hominem arguments are often charged with humour, whether mocking and playful, or cruel and biting. Nietzsche
thought of himself as a psychologist, diagnosing the mental states that inevitably give rise to certain philosophical or
moral views. He employs the ad hominem as a diagnostic strategy by identifying and attacking the affects, drives,
and character of his opponent rather than their arguments as such. The ad hominem is ordinarily considered an infor-
mal fallacy and so an unacceptable move in debate. However, as Robert Solomon points out, ad hominem arguments
do not always count as fallacies, and they can provide good grounds for dismissing, or at least being suspicious of a
person's views (Solomon, 1996; 2004 pp. 26–7).
The main problem with ad hominem arguments is that they can lead one to dismiss a good argument on the
basis of its promulgator's flaws; however, this need not be the case. For example, when a lawyer attacks a witness
on the basis of their moral failings, they do so ad hominem, but these failings can provide good grounds for dis-
missing the witness' testimony (Solomon, 2004 p. 27). The same can be true, in certain circumstances, for philosophi-
cal views. According to Solomon, ad hominem arguments can expand, rather than limit, the field of argument by
focusing not just on the soundness of premises and validity of arguments, but also on the motivations, intentions,
and circumstances that gave rise to the view under scrutiny (Solomon, 2004 p. 30). Nietzsche does both of these
things, often attacking arguments and their promulgator's character in a single breath. For fields of inquiry in which
there are no obvious truths or proofs, subjects like religion and morality, ad hominem argument can be useful for dig-
ging up and attacking the motivations behind certain claims. Humour is well-suited to ad hominem argument and can
ramp up its effect. For example, Nietzsche often uses hominem to target philosophers' ambitions to transcend their
individual psychologies and socio-economic/political circumstances. An effort that Nietzsche sees as woefully mis-
guided and risible in itself. Nietzsche takes advantage of the latent humour in philosophy's pretensions and magnifies
it to extreme proportions for rhetorical effect.
He directs one humorous ad hominem at Schopenhauer. In BGE 186, Nietzsche quotes what Schopenhauer calls
the “proper foundation of ethics;” namely, his claim: “Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can”
(Schopenhauer, 2009 p. 140). Nietzsche responds to this with vitriol and playfulness in equal measure:
Anyone who has ever truly felt how inanely false and sentimental this claim is in a world whose
essence is will to power—, they might recall that Schopenhauer, pessimism notwithstanding, actually—
played the flute … every day, after dinner. You can read it in his biography. And just out of curiosity: a
pessimist who negates both God and world but stops before morality,—who affirms morality and plays
his flute, affirms laede neminem morality: excuse me? is this really—a pessimist? (BGE 186)
BODDICKER 5
Nietzsche does not take the time to refute Schopenhauer's claim about the foundation of ethics, instead he cruelly
dismisses it as “inanely false” and “sentimental.” Furthermore, instead of presenting counter arguments to
Schopenhauer's pessimism by probing his claim that the thing in itself is will, or his claim that suffering is intrinsically
bad, he questions the sincerity of Schopenhauer's beliefs. Nietzsche paints a comic portrait of the stern philosopher,
who purportedly found so little to value in this world, relaxing after dinner by practicing the flute (presumably,
beloved poodle at his side). Nietzsche heightens the pitch of his mockery by adding that Schopenhauer “actually”
played the flute, in fact, he did so “every day,” and he had the bad sense not to hide this pastime from biographers.
Could Schopenhauer really believe that the world was bereft of value if he played the flute and affirmed morality?
Indeed, he seems to have found plenty to value. And while Schopenhauer would retort that music and morality have
value only in virtue of their capacity to negate the will to life, Nietzsche would respond by pointing out that this
seems frankly insincere in light of his behaviour. By pointing and laughing at Schopenhauer's personality and inter-
ests, he inclines those tempted by Schopenhauer's pessimism to take a distrustful step back from his extreme claims.
In TI Skirmishes 29, Nietzsche mocks Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism in a miniature dialogue, pres-
ented as “Excerpts from a doctoral exam”:
—‘What is the task of all higher schooling?' To turn men into machines.—‘What method is used?'—
They have to learn to be bored.—‘How is this done?'—Through the concept of duty.—‘Who is the
model for this?'—The philologist: he teaches you how to grind away at your work.—‘Who is the per-
fect human?'—The civil servant.—‘What philosophy gives the highest formula for the civil servant?'—
Kant's: the civil servant as thing-in-itself set to judge over the civil servant as phenomenon.—
Here, Nietzsche sweeps Kant's rigorous argumentation aside with a few jokes: Kant is a boring, civil servant's philos-
opher. Nietzsche means to draw attention to Kant's motives and circumstances. The forces that gave rise to Kant's
thought were at work elsewhere in German society. Nietzsche casts Kant's philosophy in the light of a new capitalis-
tic valorisation of work as an end in itself and the mechanisation of human beings in an industrial society. These
forces brought about the 18th and 19th century man-as-civil-servant as well as the civil servant's philosopher, Kant,
who glorified dutiful, boring, work-grinding behaviour by casting it in, as Nietzsche elsewhere mocks, “majestic moral
structures” (D preface 3; Kant, 1998).4 Nietzsche playfully considers the possibility that Kant's philosophy is not a
sublimely independent work of his intellect but rather something that developed in order to justify the mechanistic,
boring, and grinding daily life of the German civil servant. Nietzsche's joking urges us to examine the social structure
and material circumstances under which Kant developed his ideas, something philosophers would not ordinarily be
inclined to do.
Nietzsche often launches ad hominem attacks against philosophers and artists on the basis of their nationality.
These are often sweeping generalisations about a national culture; however, Nietzsche usually qualifies them to a
particular eras, centuries, or movements of thought. This is not always the case with the Germans, who he often
unqualifiedly castigates.5 When he must praise a German thinker or artist, he will separate them from their German-
ness by referring to them as “European” (TI Skirmishes 19, 49). The Germans and the English are Nietzsche's
favourite ad hominem targets, but the French get a few nudges as well (TI Skirmishes 2, 6; BGE 254).
For example, Nietzsche often appeals to the Englishness of utilitarianism's more well-known advocates in order
to criticise the view. In a more memorable ad hominem, he claims: “people don't strive for happiness, only the English
do” (TI Arrows 12). Here, Nietzsche mocks the purported universality of the utilitarian claim that all human beings
strive for happiness by presenting it as a national idiosyncrasy instead. We see here again Nietzsche's use of ad
hominem to reveal the pretentions of bold claims to universality and knock them down a peg. Nietzsche anticipates
the claim in TI with another, less pithy, ad hominem:
Ultimately, they all want English morality to be given its dues: since it is best for humanity, for the
“general utility” or “the happiness of the majority”—no! the happiness of England. They want, with all
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the strength they can muster, to prove to themselves that striving for English happiness, I mean for
comfort and fashion (and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament) (BGE 228).
While Kant's ethics is the ethics of the civil servant, utilitarianism is the ethics of the Parliamentarian. What drives it
is a desire for comfort, fashion, and herd happiness. In this way, Nietzsche disputes the universal pretensions of
Kantian and utilitarian ethics by rooting them in a particular time and place, and by postulating possible motivations
for them: a valuation of hard-work and drudgery, for Kant, and a valuation of comfort and ease, for utilitarianism.
Nietzsche often jabs at these theories, which purport to be interested in the well-being of everyone, by claiming that
they are selfish. Thus, the utilitarian is interested in “the happiness of England,” and, at least in Nietzsche's eyes, cer-
tainly not his own happiness. He makes a similar accusation of selfishness against Kant:
What? You admire the categorical imperative within you? This “firmness” of your so-called moral
judgement? This absoluteness of the feeling, “here everyone must judge as I do?” Rather admire your
selfishness here! And the blindness, pettiness, and simplicity of your selfishness! For it is selfish to con-
sider one's own judgement a universal law, and this selfishness is blind, petty, and simple… (GS 335).
Again, Nietzsche casts doubt on philosophers' supposedly disinterested motivations by considering ways in which
their philosophies might serve to prop up their own personal prejudices and nationally rooted values. Humour is a
particularly effective tool for cementing Nietzsche's point that traditional morality's claims to universality are mere
pretence. Why is this the case? There is already a germ of humour in the possibility that moral philosophers are
merely putting on airs when they purport to legislate for all humanity. If this were true, what a monstrous incongruity
it would be. Nietzsche could simply deploy sober argumentation in order to show that philosophers' claims to univer-
sality are bogus and leave it at that; however, he exploits the nascent humour in his criticism in order to drive the
point home. Nietzsche was convinced of the urgency of his critique. He saw traditional morality as deeply inimical to
flourishing and culture and so he throws everything he has at the reader in order to open their eyes to that danger.
Nietzsche's ad hominem arguments are not bald character assassination, they have a point, and they can direct
us towards the truth. They call into question the pretensions of their targets and urge us to adopt a standpoint of
suspicion. For Nietzsche, philosophical positions are, as Solomon says, “steeped in and constitutive of the character
of the person in question” (Solomon, 2004 p. 43). And so, Nietzsche attends not only to arguments but also to their
source. Because we cannot assume that philosophical works spring forth entirely independently of the cultural,
material, and psychological contingencies that surround their creation, we need to have a look at these things as well.
Humour is an effective rhetorical tool in this context because philosophers have traditionally conceived of their work
as transcending cultural, material, and psychological contingency. Nietzsche capitalises on this incongruity and uses
humour to blow up the contingent aspects of moral philosophy to grotesque proportions. What Nietzsche offers is a
kind of caricature sketch, he zeroes in on some contingent facts about a philosopher and their work, like
Schopenhauer's psychological idiosyncrasies, and makes them stick out like exaggerated facial features. At his best,
Nietzsche's humour can make his points seem almost blindingly obvious, but then of course we must take a
closer look.
3 | NIETZSCHE'S COMMUNITY OF TASTE
One difference between affects like humour, or mirth, and other affects that Nietzsche deploys against morality, like
disgust, is that humour has a strong social dimension. Disgust does have a social dimension. Things are certainly
found disgusting in some cultures that are not found disgusting in others. In ancient cultures especially, we find that
the practices and customs of rival groups were deemed disgusting or unclean in order to delineate the bounds of
one's own culture and to solidify group identity. Nevertheless, humour's positive affective valence binds people
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together in way that disgust does not do quite as effectively. Nietzsche exploits this social dimension for his philo-
sophical purposes. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists working on humour generally recognise that it is a
social phenomenon.6 Humour is capable of strengthening social bonds and fostering a sense of community. It creates
in-groups and out-groups: those who 'get' the joke and those who do not, those who are the butt of the joke and
those doing the joking. Laughter together is pleasant and can indicate shared beliefs, prejudices, and values. It is cer-
tainly more pleasant than feeling disgust together. As Alfano notes, “because laughter typically arises spontaneously
in reaction to eliciting conditions, laughter is a difficult-to-fake, difficult-to-stifle expression of what one does and
does not value” (Alfano, 2018 p. 66). Laughing with other people helps cement shared beliefs and values and to
erode confidence in the beliefs and values of the object of laughter. Nietzsche takes advantage of the social aspect
of laughter in order to draw hypothetical individuals into a community that shares his tastes in a broad sense. Nietz-
sche recognises, with a mixture of anxiety and pride, that he is “untimely” and that few will be receptive to his ideals.
He uses humour in order to draw out those more sympathetic to his views, to cement their beliefs further in his
direction, and to put strain on their complacent acceptance of morality. Nietzsche is interested in drawing people like
himself away from traditional morality; namely, people capable of creating great works of culture.
In Nietzsche's earliest writings, he endorses the romantic thought that mythology is the core of a genuine cul-
ture, and the further thought that a new, self-consciously constructed mythology was necessary in the modern
world. He thought that Wagner's music dramas could provide the mythic core that would launch a general rebirth of
German culture. In The Birth of Tragedy, he charts the rise and fall of Greek tragedy and envisages a reinvigoration of
the spirit of the genre in Wagner's music. At his most romantically optimistic, he claims:
Let no one believe that the German spirit has lost its mythical homeland forever when it still clearly
understands the voice of the bird that speaks of that homeland. One day it will awake in the morning
freshness from a deep sleep. Then it will kill the dragon, destroy the malicious dwarf, and awaken Brü-
nhilde—and even Wotan's spear will not block its path (BT 24).
His hopes on this score were bitterly dashed. Wagner's inaugural Bayrueth festival was an uninspiring event
attended by bourgeois spectators more interested in socialising than in the music itself. In his later work, he set his
sights on a more modest aim. Not for an elevated, and general, German culture, but a higher (non-national) culture
open to an elite few (Gemes and Sykes, 2015). Through his writings, Nietzsche aimed to wake up and encourage
those who were capable to strive for freedom, affirmation, and greatness. He believed that if he could find suitable
readers with ears to hear, then his writing could inspire them to struggle against traditional morality and create great
works of culture. Parodying Christ's self-description as a fisher of men, Zarathustra claims: “my very happiness I cast
far and wide, between sunrise, noon and sunset, to see if many human fishes learn to jiggle and wiggle on my happi-
ness. Until, biting on my sharp hidden hooks, they have to emerge into my height, the motliest gorge gudgeons to
the most spiteful of all fishers of human fish” (Z On the Honey Sacrifice). Nietzsche's own humour can perhaps be
seen as one such “hidden hook.”
Thus, we often see Nietzsche preoccupied with finding the right kind of audience. These preoccupations abound
in his prefaces. He begins his preface to The Anti-Christ by claiming: “This book belongs to the very few. Perhaps
none of them are even alive yet… My day won't come until the day after tomorrow. Some people are born posthu-
mously” (A preface 1). In the preface to Daybreak, he asks with some trepidation, “But do you not understand me?”7
and closes with an injunction: “My patient friends, this book desires for itself only perfect readers and philologists:
learn to read me well” (D preface 2, 5). Nietzsche places high demands on his ideal audience, and he tries to foster
intimacy with them, his 'patient friends,' who may not even be alive yet. Again, in the preface to the Genealogy, he
places further demands upon his readers: “If this book is unintelligible to anyone and hard on the ears, the fault, as I
see it, does not necessarily lie with me” (GM preface 1). He presupposes that his readers have knowledge of his ear-
lier writings and that they have “not spared some effort in the process” as “these are in fact not easily accessible.”
He then heightens his demands further:
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As far as my Zarathustra is concerned, for example, I count no one as an authority who has not at
sometime been deeply wounded and at sometime deeply delighted by each of its words: for only then
may he enjoy the privilege of reverent participation in the halcyon element out of which the work
was born (GM preface 8).
Nietzsche demands above all a deep emotional involvement with his writings. There is an element of what Nietzsche calls
“perspectivism” here. To engage with Zarathustra properly, one ought to be able to experience each of its words from a
painful and wounding perspective, and then be able to shift perspective and reread each word joyfully. Nietzsche invites
the reader to get under his skin and “participate” in the 'halcyon element' out of which he created it. The reader must digest
his “fare,” and “ruminate,” slowly, attending to the different ways in which it makes them feel (GS prelude 1, GM preface 8).
One way in which he attempts to coax out his ideal reader is by fostering intimacy with them through his sense
of humour. Ted Cohen remarks in his book on jokes that joking has the capacity to cultivate the intimacy of a shared
sense of community. This seems to be one of the things that Nietzsche tries to achieve with his jokes. Cohen claims
that this kind of community has two constituents. The first is a shared set of beliefs, dispositions, prejudices, or points
of view on the world, and the second is a shared feeling or response to something. Cohen claims that both of these
things can be fostered without jokes, but that jokes can use the second constituent to amplify the first (Cohen, 1999
p. 28). He notes that we are disappointed when others do not get our jokes and that when they do, it satisfies a deep
human longing; namely, to know that “we are enough like one another to sense one another, and to live together”
(Cohen, 1999 p. 29). A joke does not compel its conclusion in the way that an argument does. When one person finds
a joke amusing and tells it to another, and the recipient does not find it funny, it is not necessarily because they do
not understand the joke, rather it is because there is some part of them that is unlike the teller. Some aspect of the
teller allows them to be amused by the joke, and this aspect is lacking in the recipient. When a joke succeeds, and
both parties laugh together, there is a shared sense of community. They are similar in some way, and they enjoy a
feeling of intimacy. Cohen and Nietzsche are unlikely bedfellows. Cohen's account of jokes is largely egalitarian, for
him, when another laughs at my joke I am reassured “that this something inside me, the something that is tickled by a
joke, is indeed something that constitutes an element of my humanity” (Cohen, 1999 p. 31). Nietzsche's jokes, on the
other hand, are often made at the expense of egalitarian values and are meant to appeal to ambivalences about them.
The community that Nietzsche appeals to is not ‘humanity’ but a kind of aristocratic cultural elite.
In this way, Nietzsche's jokes are designed to draw in his ideal readers, those who share his tastes in a broad sense.
He is trying to both foster and draw out already existing feelings of misgiving against the targets of his jokes. They are
meant to resonate with those who, for example, have misgivings about traditional morality in its various forms. His ideal
readers will be amused by his barbed remarks about English comfort and herd happiness and about German drudgery
and its un-aristocratic valuation of work as an end in itself. His jokes are meant to appeal to those with certain philo-
sophical and aesthetic sensibilities, those sensibilities that he thinks are conducive to greatness. Nietzsche does not
envisage his ideal readers as a coterie of like-minded thinkers, with identical views to himself, rather, he means to
inspire those with certain character traits to seek out their own independence. Nietzsche is looking for readers who
share that part of himself that finds certain things funny or certain people and views worthy of mockery. Nietzsche's
humour tracks the capacity to create great works of culture because if one shares Nietzsche sense of humour, then one
shares at least some of his values, and sharing Nietzsche's values is, for him, a precondition for producing such works.
Nevertheless, one can of course have ambivalences about slave morality, and so enjoy Nietzsche's jokes, without
having these noble capacities. One thing Cohen's theory does not countenance is our capacity to laugh and joke
about ourselves. Nietzsche values this capacity and tries to cultivate it in his readers with humour. He uses jokes to
encourage his readers to take a step back from their values and laugh at them. In this way, humour affords a critical
distance that can serve as a standpoint from which we can call our values into question. Nietzsche thinks that certain
questions about our values are wrongly considered to be off limits; and furthermore, that we have been unable even
to raise questions that he sees as especially pressing. Nietzsche claims to be after “knowledge of a kind that has nei-
ther existed up to now nor even been desired” (GM preface 6). He criticises moral philosophers for taking the value
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of compassion and selflessness for granted and for offering what he sees as post hoc rationalisations for their preju-
dices. Schopenhauer, for example, treats the content of morality as immediately obvious before plunging into a
lengthy investigation of its grounds. For Nietzsche, this is to set off entirely on the wrong foot. Thus, he proclaims
that “the value of these values must itself be called into question.” He takes this to be virgin territory; “until now one
has not had even the slightest doubt or hesitation in raking “the good” as of higher value than the evil” (GM preface
6). Given the radically new nature of his project he claims: “I myself had reasons for looking about for learned, bold,
and industrious comrades (I am still doing so today).” Had he been in the mood, he could have added that he requires
comrades with a sense of humour about themselves and their values. By encouraging the reader to laugh at their
values, he dispels the reverence that stops them from questioning them and that stops them from seeing them as
questionable. Thus, even if one does not share Nietzsche's aristocratic ideals, it does seem possible to share in his
laughter, so long as one has the capacity to take a critical step back from one's values.
One thing Nietzsche does in the “Skirmishes” section of Twilight is give rapid sketches of his aesthetic and philo-
sophical tastes. He offers his opinions and feelings about so many thinkers and artists that one would be hard
pressed to find anyone who agreed with all of them, but that is not the point. Nietzsche is displaying his tastes to
provide the reader with a self-portrait, telling them his likes and dislikes in order to make an example of himself. He
tries to carve out a noble, aristocratic taste by disdaining anything he deems common, vulgar, mediocre, or plebeian
(TI Germans 6; Skirmishes 3, 45, 48). He charges this self-portrait with jokes in order to foster intimacy with a hypo-
thetical community of others who share his capacity to produce great works. He calls Twilight a “declaration of war”,
and in it, he challenges anything that to him remotely smells of “ideality” or slave morality (TI preface). The ‘Skir-
mishes’ section abounds with barbed jokes meant both to foster certain sensibilities by challenging figures in the his-
tory of art and thought, and to resonate with his (perhaps unborn) ideal readers' already existing sensibilities. The
first section of “Skirmishes” contains a flurry of ad hominem jokes directed at Seneca, Rousseau, Schiller, Dante,
Kant, Hugo, Liszt, Sand, Michelet, Carlyle, Mill, and Zola. Nietzsche uses a shotgun tactic to sketch out his aristocratic
sensibilities and his antipathy towards “Modern ideas,” bad psychology, pessimism, and romanticism (EH Twilight 2).
What kind of sensibilities is Nietzsche trying to appeal to in section 1 of ‘Skirmishes’? For one, a taste for the
light, affirmative, aristocratic, and courtly poetry of the Provençal troubadour to his successor, “Dante: or the hyena
who writes poetry in tombs” (TI Skirmishes 1). A taste for Stendhal's “psychologist's eye and grasp of the facts” over
‘Zola: or ‘the joy of stinking,” and more generally, the “Parisian novelist” who “cannot put three sentences together
without it hurting your eye, the psychologists eye” (EH Clever 3; TI Skirmishes 1, 7). Nietzsche also envied Stendhal's
sense of humour: ‘He beat me to the best atheism joke, just the sort of thing that I would say: “God's only excuse is
that he doesn't exist” (EH Clever 3). Stendhal is evidently part of Nietzsche's community of taste. A taste also for
Napoleon and Goethe's “return to nature” over Rousseau's. Goethe returned to nature “by coming toward the natu-
ralness of the Renaissance,” a “high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness,” whereas Rousseau wanted to return
to the supposed original equality of nature (TI Skirmishes 49, 48). Accordingly, Nietzsche quips: “Rousseau: or the
return to nature in impuris naturalibus,” or ‘in natural dirtiness’ (TI Skirmishes 1). Finally, a taste for his own withholding
and easily misunderstood style, full of detours, ambiguities, masks, and misdirection to John Stuart Mill's “insulting
clarity” (TI Skirmishes 1). In this way, Nietzsche tries to root out, and perhaps to create, his ideal readers by drafting a
standard of taste. And he tries to win readers over to his standard by fostering intimacy through his sense of humour.
In Cohen's terms, Nietzsche's jokes create a shared feeling of amusement that serves to amplify the reader's existing
beliefs or prejudices against the joke's target. It also seems true that a well-placed joke can kindle a belief where
none existed before or amplify an unconscious prejudice into a firmly held and conscious distaste.
Nietzsche's humour makes up an important part of his attempt to engage his readers' affects. I have considered a
number of different, often interrelated, uses to which he puts it. First, he uses it to dislodge thick beliefs, beliefs that
agents would be reluctant to give up in the face of sober argument alone. Second, Nietzsche thinks that we have
inherited an unconscious reverence towards traditional morality and traditional institutions that hinder us from seeing
them as objects of possible criticism. His humour provides a counterbalance to this reverence and affords an emo-
tional distance from which we can scrutinise things previously held to be off-limits. Third, Nietzsche uses humour to
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cement his points on an affective level. Nietzsche saw his critique as urgent, and so he pulls no punches in attempting
to convince his readers of its urgency. He often uses humorous ad hominem arguments in order to do this. Fourth,
Nietzsche exploits humour's social dimension in order to foster intimacy with his readers. He uses humour to seek out
people who share his values, and consequently people who have the capacity for greatness, to draw them closer to
his side, and to put more distance between them and slave morality. The way in which Nietzsche affects us is often
challenging and confrontational, and the same can be said for his jokes. He tests our integrity by calling for us to
reckon with our deepest feelings in our attempts to enquire into ourselves and our values. Since most of his readers
are inheritors of slave morality, his sallies against it can be provocative and unsettling. By making the reader look at
the ways in which they are attracted and repelled by certain values, he fosters the capacity to postpone judgment and
to look at the matter under enquiry from multiple sides. Nietzsche prescribes a relentless self-scrutiny of one's feel-
ings, and the critical distance afforded by laughter and humour can enable the reader to engage in that self-scrutiny.8
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ENDNOTES
1 A number of commentators rightly point out the connection between laughter and affirming life or overcoming nihilism:
Ansell-Pearson, 1994; Gordon, 2015; Gunter, 1968; Hatab, 1988; Lippitt, 1992; Meyer, 2012; 2018; Weeks, 2004;
Wirth, 2005. This is an important topic that would take me too far afield from my main concern here, which is Nietzsche's
humorous style and his attempts to evoke ordinary experiences of laughter or mirth.
2 See: Alfano, 2018 ; Glazer, 2017; Gordon, 2015; Higgins, 2000.
3 I do not mean to assume the truth of the incongruity theory of humour, merely that we often find incongruous things
amusing. Nietzsche recognises this: HH 16, 169, 213.
4 This phrase is from Kant, 1998 B 375.
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5 See: EHWagner 4: “It is even my ambition to be considered the despiser of the Germans par excellence.”
6 See: Alfano, 2018; Carroll, 2014; Cohen, 1999; Curry & Dunbar, 2013; Dennett, 1978; Dezecache & Dunbar, 2012;
Morreall, 2009.
7 This question becomes a frequent refrain. See EH Destiny 3, 7, 8, 9.
8 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, as well as Christopher Janaway, Ken Gemes,
Aaron Ridley, and Felix Hagenström for many excellent discussions, which greatly improved this article.
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